GUEST POST: Afghani Emigration Takes Toll on Pakistan by Lauren Bailey

US-Pakistani relations have recently come under greater scrutiny, as American citizens question the worth and consequences of sending billions of dollars in foreign aid to what appears to be an unstable, incompetent Pakistani government. However, as one delves further into the history and status quo of the Pakistani-American relationship, it becomes impossible to blame the current political situation solely on the Zardari regime. The Pakistani military and Pakistani civilians have been and continue to be the greatest casualties of extremist attacks, as former “freedom fighters” illegally enter Pakistan’s Northwestern Frontier.

For us Americans to better understand the situation, we must first critically examine the history of Afghani emigration to Pakistan, which has allowed the country to become a stronghold and base for Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. For the sake of brevity and topicality, this analysis will exclude Afghani emigrants (human rights victims) seeking refugee status in Pakistan, as they do not threaten Pakistan’s nor America’s national security. Secondly, we must understand what signifies “foreign aid” in the context of the Pakistani-American alliance before we criticize it.

The Soviet-Afghan conflict of the 1980s served as a proxy war for the United States and Soviet Union, but it had lasting, unfortunate impacts on Pakistani domestic and foreign policy. The United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and China financially and ideologically supported Afghan indigenous militants, known as muhajedeens, while they fought off the Soviet endorsed Marxist Afghani government. Ronald Reagan referred to these militants, armed with the latest weaponry and technology, as freedom fighters until the American mission of weakening the Soviet Union was complete. Once the Soviets left the muhajedeens were left armed without a check on their power. The United States, with its primary objective met, refused to help rebuild the country—a torn country left with mass reparation costs and anywhere from 2-5 million civilian casualties.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were left alone to pick up the tab for the immigration and reparation problems, after the war both politically and economically. The Afghan militants within Afghanistan began to fight each other for control over Kabul, and the Pakistani government was left in mayhem as it struggled to choose a side (among different factions). In the 1990s, the Pakistani regime ended up supporting the Taliban stronghold, which also had disastrous consequences. Although the Zia regime did help sustain some of the militants within their borders, the former Bhutto administration and current Zardari regime wanted them out of their borders and out of Kashmir. By that time, it was more than a little too late. The Pakistani military continues to battle illegal immigrants in addition to Pakistani extremist bases within their own borders, where Taliban hold schools, training facilities, and operations.

During the Soviet war (and after), 3.3. million Afghanis emigrated to the Pakistani Northwestern province. Some came seeking refuge from mass human rights violations within Afghanistan. They were looked after in refugee camps, endorsed by the UNHCR. Alternatively, a large number of those still residing in the Pakistani province and in main cities, such as Peshawar, have fueled anti-western sentiment and an anti-Pakistan sentiment within Pakistani borders. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency Report, the Pakistani government struggles to crack down on illegal Afghani refugees, who are responsible for smuggling drugs and committing violent crimes against civilians and military personnel. The 2007 CRS Report on Afghani Refugees also further details the illegal trades and prevalent crimes within the tribal provinces, where central administration is weak. The smuggling of narcotics and weapons help provide revenue for Pashtun (Afghani) leaders in the area, and in turn, tribal leaders are able to bypass federal laws.

After the September 11th attacks, the United States went to clean up the mess it started years ago. The government and military used and continues to use Pakistani roads and passageways to supply their troops in Afghanistan. The United States undoubtedly pays Pakistan for its services, but it is unfair to call this compensation “foreign aid.” The so-called “aid” serves as reimbursement for Pakistani supplies (fuel), services, and military work used primarily for US troops.

Afghan militants continue to reside in the Northwestern frontier of Pakistan, and the UNHCR and the Pakistani government have made a concentrated effort to help civilian Afghan refugees return home. However, the majority of militants continue to use Pakistan as their base to attack American troops. Does it seem logical to expect what we do from the Pakistani government? Although the Taliban and Afghan militants (not mutually exclusive groups) continue to operate in Pakistan, have we offered combat support to Pakistan? Definitely not. Yet, we continue to castigate the Pakistani military for being unable to secure their borders. Does Pakistan have greater problems, as it battles immigration issues, economic problems, and increasingly large illiteracy rates? Anyone living in the country would answer yes, all of the above. Before we ask our ally for unreal expectations and help, we need to remember how these problems started in the first place. If we want to let bygones be bygones, we can’t expect someone else to pick up our slack, slack that has cost Pakistan thousands of its civilians and its finest troops.

By-line: This guest post is contributed by Lauren Bailey, who regularly writes for online colleges. She welcomes your comments at her email Id: blauren99@gmail.com.