Assessing the Prospects of Competing Agricultural Guest Worker Legislation: The Inherency of Unequal Bargaining Power in a Status Quo of Non-Enforcement by Ian David Baldwin
Assessing the Prospects of Competing Agricultural Guest Worker Legislation: The Inherency of Unequal Bargaining Power in a Status Quo of Non-Enforcement by Ian David Baldwin, George Mason University School of Law September 11, 2014
Abstract: This assessment of the major Congressional proposals by Democrats (HR 1773) and Republicans (S.744) to fashion a new guest worker program critiques the solvency of each proposal through the lens of their effect on illegal immigration. While S.744 may succeed at enticing migrants to apply through the W-Visa program in search of higher wages, portability rights, and the opportunity for a path to citizenship, the proposal may prove untenable to employers who view W-Visa holders as too costly. On the other hand, HR 1773 falls victim to the opposite problem – although growers will appreciate the stability of a workforce with little bargaining power, migrants will have little incentive to sign up for a visa program that affords them piece rate wages equal to what they would earn in an illegal setting.
KJ